1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

capricious rancours and favouritisms before that; all could find in crude xenophobia a popular applauded attitude. None could count on any security of tenure of their post; a term of office of two or three years was exceptional. Flagrant personal dishonesty was rarer among the highest officials than it had been a generation before, but was still familiar enough and viewed with tolerance. The use of generals as civil governors increased after 1908.

Typical of the better high officials were the loyal and just Ṭahir Pasha, Wali of Mosul in 1910: 'Awnullah Bey, Mutaṣarrif of Kirkuk from 1910 to 1913, still quoted as the ideal of virile governors: 'Ali Ridhā Bey, competent commander and cordial friend of Lorimer, who acted as Wali of Baghdad in 1912: Jalal Pasha graduated from Mutaṣarrif of Karbalā to be Wali of Baṣra, and reappeared, morose and disillusioned, as Wali of Baghdad in 1913. Ḥamdi Pasha, at Baṣra in 1900, was an honest and vigorous admiral. His successor Fakhri Pasha was reputed to sew up his criminals in sacks and consign them to the Shaṭṭ. 'Arif Bey Mardini, at Baṣra in 1909, with his modern home life and English nurse for his children, surprised all by his incorruptibility. Sulayman Naṣif Bey, Wali of Baṣra in 1909, arrived, as did most newcomers, full of schemes of improvement. The rabidly patriotic Jamal Pasha, Wali of Baghdad in 1911–12, left to become Military Governor of Istanbul and later to be notorious in Syria. Ḥazim Bey, in Baghdad in 1907, installed Baghdad's first water-supply system. Jawad Pasha, the last Wali of Baghdad before the war, was remembered as the first to use a motor-car of his own. 'Umar Luṭfi Pasha, assistant Wali under Nadhim Pasha, was known as the worried chairman of a score of committees and inquiries. Such are but a random few of the Pashas[1] of whom some more than average merit or quality is recalled. Good representatives of the older school were Zaki Pasha, G.O.C. and Wali in 1912–13 and, more notably, Muḥammad Fadhil Pasha Daghistani, the Grand Old Man of Turkish 'Iraq, chivalrous and stone-deaf, who acted as Wali in the intervals of commanding the Army, and led a score of expeditions against the recalcitrant. Very different were the aged Faydhi Pasha, Wali and G.O.C. in 1902–4, and famous for his corruption: 'Abd al-Wahhab Pasha the Albanian, Wali of Baghdad in 1905 and the terror of foreigners and their consuls:

[1] The twentieth-century Walis of Baghdad were: Namiq Pasha, 1898–1902: Aḥmad Faydhi Pasha, 1902–4: 'Abd al-Wahhab Pasha, 1904: 'Abd al-Majid Bey, 1905: Ḥazim Bey, 1907: Nadhim Pasha (acting), 1907: Najm al-Din Bey, 1908: Gen. Muḥammad Shawkat Pasha, 1909: Gen. Ḥusayn Nadhim Pasha, 1910–11: Yusif Pasha (acting), 1911: Jamal Pasha, 1911–12: Muḥammad Zaki Pasha, 1912: Gen. Ḥusayn Jalal Bey, 1913: Gen. Javid (Jawad) Pasha, 1914: Dr. Rashid Bey, 1915: Sulayman Nadhif Bey, 1915: and thereafter the G.O.C. 6th Army. Others, notably Muḥammad Fadhil Pasha Daghistani, acted for short periods as Wali.

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and Muṣṭafā Pasha, brother of 'Izzat Pasha the Sultan's hated secretary, who was cast out from Mosul in 1909 by the incoming C.U.P.

But the outstanding figure of these years was Ḥusayn Nadhim Pasha, a military commander of great prestige with a history of ill-treatment by Sultan 'Abd al-Ḥamid. He was appointed in April 1910 as G.O.C. and Wali of Baghdad with powers of supervision over the other wilayas. He overhauled his vast body of officials, concentrated his troops for intensive training, collected revenue from some wayward tribes, and made indulgent terms with others. He held durbars, patronized education, was reasonably just to the minorities, took flood protection in hand, ordered river craft for town ferries and for an abortive Euphrates service, and pressed on the demolitions for a new thoroughfare in Baghdad. He possessed integrity and resolution: his weaknesses were an excessive desire for apparent modernity, a lack of preparation for his grandiose schemes, too little sense of financial orthodoxy or private rights (especially of foreigners), and easy surrender to bad advisers. His recall to Istanbul in February 1911, due to C.U.P. intrigues fed by Baghdadi tale-bearers, allowed him less than a year of rule in 'Iraq. Mass demonstrations accompanied his departure from Baghdad; and his political murder at the capital in 1913 by Enver's party aroused strong sympathy for him in his old province.

3. TOWN AND TRIBE

With the survival after 1900 of many backward features in the town life of 'Iraq, the first fifteen years of the century nevertheless showed certain progress: a progress quickened by the influence of increased foreign trade, more visitors from without and more foreign residents, an expanded press and political life.

The gulf fixed between the main Muslim communities grew rather wider than narrower in the changing times, since their reaction to the insistent call for Turkish centralization must be different. Sunni and Shi'i found little common ground, Kurd and Arab no more. The Yazidis fiercely resisted conscription: the Turkomans regretted 'Abd al-Ḥamid. The priest-ridden communities of Persians in the Holy Cities drew no nearer to the main public of the country. The Mujtahids continued to reject temporal government whether of Sultan or of Committee, and to embarrass the British Resident by their attitude of greedy non-cooperation over the Oudh Bequest funds. Their presence and abused privileges were never more intolerable to the Turkish rulers than in this period, nor were they themselves ever more active in meetings, intrigues, and pronouncements. Rejecting the would-be moderating approaches of the British Resident, they bombarded

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loss. In the 'Iraq Government service 'Iraqis of goodwill and sometimes of admirable gifts—not unmixed, inevitably, with others of less ability or less integrity—were found to fill the higher as well as lower positions in provincial and central government. The body of British officials, mainly advisory but in a few cases still executive, included some figures of outstanding merit—and many who offered years, twenty or more, of quiet efficient service to 'Iraq.

A Ministry of Foreign Affairs, its portfolio held always in the early period by the Prime Minister himself, was the creation of Yasin Pasha in 1925. Under the overriding responsibility of Great Britain to the League for the fulfilment of 'Iraqi international obligations, the Ministry could have but limited scope. It was at first represented only in London, and intermittently at Geneva, by Ja'far Pasha al-'Askari. Foreign Consuls, however, began early to be posted to Baghdad, where their presence implied recognition of the 'Iraq State by France, Italy, Norway, Sweden, Germany, and Greece. The 'Iraq Government as such subscribed to various international conventions. Persia, though represented in 'Iraq by a number of Consuls and bound to it by the closest interests, withheld official recognition of the Kingdom, to the damage of both.

Successive Cabinets up to that of Yasin Pasha in 1924 have been elsewhere mentioned. Yasin's was a Ministry of all the talents, and since no alternative programmes backed by parties existed in the 'Iraq politics of the time, it like others must fall or survive by virtue of its own unanimity and the royal approval, or lack of these. Its months of power were marked by preoccupation with the politics of the Mosul Question, and by the frustrations of an empty Treasury. This poverty, the common misfortune of nascent Governments, was accentuated in the 'Iraq of 1925 by depressed trade conditions, the loss of part of the date market, the diminished Persian transit trade, and the bad harvest and low revenue of the year; and the times called insistently for more, not less, expenditure. It was necessary to find funds for an Army now under formation and soon to be called to vital responsibilities: for the acquisition of assets from the British Government, which itself was in no mood for munificent gestures: for the service of the Ottoman Public Debt, of which a substantial fraction devolved upon 'Iraq: and for public services conceived on a scale reputed the minimum tolerable, but still far in advance of financial capacity. The arithmetical impossibilities thus involved led to the advent by invitation in March 1924 of a financial mission from Whitehall, consisting of Commander E. Hilton-Young and R. V. Vernon. The mission studied and reviewed, advocated limited economies, strove to palliate the resented blow of Public Debt obligations, and

1-[1921-26--Analyst]